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1 Introduction
Today’s nation-state1 democracies face two major challenges: i.) a decline of citizens’
satisfaction with democracy and trust in democratic institutions and ii.) the transfer of
governance2 functions upwards, downwards and sideways away from nation-state institu-
tions.
These two challenges can affect the legitimacy of nation-state democracies. While dis-
trusting and dissatisfied citizens can pose a threat to the survival of politicians in office,
to the standing of a political system as a whole and can reduce the state’s ability to exert
control (see e.g. Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, 2000), the transfer of governance functions
to non-representative and non-elected actors questions fundamental principles of repre-
sentative democracy such as the accountability of governing actors to their constituencies
and reduces the decision-making power and autonomy of representative institutions (Pa-
padopoulos, 2007; Jensen, 2009; Williams and Warren, 2014).
Existing research proposes two ways of linking these challenges. On the one hand, some
scholars argue that dissatisfaction with and distrust in politicians and democratic insti-
tutions can partly be explained by their limited capacity to govern, which in turn partly
results from the transfer of governance functions to institutions above, below or aside
of the nation-state. This “de-nationalization” of governance is, thus, seen as a potential
cause for the decline of satisfaction and trust Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000, 24). Here,
a macro event - i.e. the transfer of governance functions - is seen as a cause for a micro
level change - i.e. the decline of public support. On the other hand, scholars investigate
the links between support for nation-state democracy and support for governance institu-
tions and processes “beyond the state” (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Ecker-Ehrhardt,
2011; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2011; Kübler, 2016). In other words, they link two micro
level phenomena to one another - usually assuming that support for nation-state democ-
1When I speak of the nation-state I do not mean a political community consisting of a certain ‘ethnos’.
Rather, I use this term to speak of “established” governance institutions and levels within the multi-level
structure of modern democracies, e.g. the local or the national level.
2Throughout this paper, I use the term governance as “all forms of governing” (Bevir, 2013, 1) and
not as opposed to the term government (Stoker, 1998).
racy determines support for transferring governance functions “beyond the state”.
In this paper, I take on the second perspective and hence adopt an attitudinal approach
to explore the links between the two challenges. I do so by analyzing citizens’ support
for the political integration of metropolitan areas3 - a context in which the transfer and
re-organization of governance functions is a debated issue (Swanstrom, 2001; Savitch and
Vogel, 2009) but little is known about citizens’ attitudes towards it. More specifically, I
assess how citizens’ support for subnational democracy and political institutions is linked
to support for the political integration of metropolitan areas. The data under scrutiny
stem from a unique online-survey among 5’000 citizens in eight metropolitan areas in
Switzerland, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
A positive correlation indicates that dissatisfied citizens are not only critical of the func-
tioning of nation-state governance but of today’s governance arrangements more generally
- the causes for dissatisfaction would hence have to be sought in common structural fea-
tures shared by politics both within and “beyond the state”. A negative correlation could
indicate that citizens’ perceive the transfer of governance functions away from nation-state
institutions as a potential remedy for the deficiencies of nation-state democracy.
3A metropolitan area here refers to a region with one or several urban centres at its core and a
surrounding belt of suburban territories. These regions are defined by their strong functional integration
in terms of economic and social interactions and high spatial mobility of its residents. For a comparable
definition of these areas, I rely on the “larger urban zones” as defined by Urban Audit (2011).
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2 Theoretical Argument
In this section, I very briefly introduce two challenges to democractic legitimacy. In a
second step I elaborate on the links between support for nation-state democracy and
support for the transfer of governance functions by drawing on public opinion research
investigating European integration and apply it to the metropolitan context.
2.1 Two Challenges to Modern Democracies
Challenge 1: Public Discontent with Modern Democracy
The question of how citizens (should) perceive political institutions and participate in
political processes in a functioning democracy has generated a lot of both normative and
empirical scholarly attention (Åmna and Ekman, 2014). Generally speaking, there are
two different interpretations of declining support for democracy mentioned in the intro-
duction: a pessimistic and an optimistic one.
Pessimists view the decline in support for democracy as a serious threat to modern democ-
racy (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2000). The functioning of representative democ-
racy hinges on active citizens that voice their claims in recurring elections. Furthermore,
they have to believe that political institutions and the political system in general is re-
sponsive to their preferences. In established democracies, this belief has eroded over the
last decades. According to some scholars, citizens became increasingly alienated from
politics and electoral abstention became a widespread phenomenon (Pharr and Putnam,
2000). In their eyes, electoral abstention in combination with low levels of satisfaction
and low levels of trust in political institutions, is a reason for concern: Citizens do not
approve of their rulers’ actions and at the same time they do not perceive to have a
viable exit or voice option (Hirschman, 1970). This combination then can enhance the
alienation from politics even further (Lyons and Lowery, 1986) and - ultimately - lead to
disapproval of democracy as the preferable system of government altogether (see Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse, 2006).
A more optimistic interpretation of the declining support for democracy is offered by
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Norris (1999a). Following Easton (1965) she differentiates between different objects of
political support that have different degrees of specificity. The most diffuse object of sup-
port is the political community, while the most specific object of support are the political
actors (Norris, 1999b). Empirical analyses show, that the time trends for political sup-
port are not uniform across different objects. While diffuse support (i.e. for the political
community and for regime principles) remains stable over time, “there is clear evidence
of a general erosion in support for politicians in most advanced industrial democracies”
(Dalton, 1999, 63). These diverging trends of support for different political objects with
different degrees of specificity are interpreted as a good sign for democracy: citizens uphold
the fundamental values of democracy but they are more critical of political authorities
and political actors, and they monitor their actions more closely (Inglehart, 1999). This
is interpreted as a contribution to the functioning of democracy: only when citizens are
critical of their representatives, they will throw potential rascals out. Accordingly, Norris
(1999b, 27) states that “too much blind trust by citizens and misplaced confidence in
leaders, for good or ill, can be as problematic for democracy as too little”.
Challenge 2: The Transfer of Governance Functions
The transfer of governance functions is the second challenge for nation-state democracies’
legitimacy that I address in this paper. Here, the transfer of governance functions refers
to the relocation of political power and decision-making authority from nation-state insti-
tutions and levels - e.g. parliaments at the local or the national level - towards governance
institutions “beyond the state”, usually operating at other levels. This process of “de- and
reterritorialization” (Brenner, 1999, 435) puts pressure on nation-state institutions “from
above, from below and from within” (Kübler, 2015, 59). From above some nation-state
institutions face constraints in their governing capacity by a proliferation of international
institutions and regulations.4 This upward transfer of governance functions manifests it-
self most evidently in the processes associated with European integration (Mattli, 1999).
4Such institutions and regulations are in turn portrayed as a result of increasing interdependencies
between nation-states in economic, cultural, and political terms (Kriesi, 2013, 3).
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From below, nation-state democracies are challenged by transformations that occur within
their territories. Most notably, the rise of metropolitan areas - functionally and economi-
cally highly integrated territories - pose new problems to nation-state governance. On the
one hand, the significance of these areas for nation-state economies renders region-wide
governance and political control desirable to enhance a region’s global competitiveness
(Brenner, 1999). On the other hand, metropolitan areas cross-cut existing political and
administrative boundaries, which requires new forms and levels of governance to efficiently
govern them. Finally, nation-state democracy is challenged from within by increasingly
“blurred boundaries between the public and the private” (Kübler, 2015, 60). An increas-
ing number of non-elected and private actors participate in policy-making processes and
exert influence on elected representatives and governments (Papadopoulos, 2007). Fur-
thermore, nation-states delegate numerous tasks to semi-public or private organizations
hoping to thereby increase the efficiency and flexibility of service provision (Andrew and
Goldsmith, 1998).
A common allegation against these transfers of governance functions is that they bring
about legitimacy deficits for nation-state democracies and governance institutions “be-
yond the state” alike (Kriesi, 2013, 8). The latter usually lack input legitimacy. They
have at best indirect links to citizens because decision-makers in these institutions are not,
or not directly, elected representatives of a - however defined - people (Jensen, 2009). For
citizens, this means that it is more difficult, if not impossible, to hold such decision-makers
accountable (Papadopoulos, 2007). Hence, their input legitimacy is put into question.
For nation-state institutions the challenge is another one. While legislative and executive
institutions formally possess input legitimacy - they are elected by their constituencies
and accountable to them - they might lack output legitimacy. Their capacity to act is -
to a greater or lesser extent - constrained by regulations and actions of governance insti-
tutions “beyond the state”.5 Under certain circumstances, such external constraints can
inhibit nation-state institutions from meeting the demands of their constituencies and
5An example is national monetary policy for the members of the Economic and Monetary Union: For
individual nation-states it is no longer possible to boost the economy of their countries by turning on the
cash printing presses. To do so, they have to negotiate with the other member states of this institution.
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thereby decrease their output legitimacy.6. In sum, the transfer of governance functions
can pose a challenge to some of modern representative democracies’ foundations.
2.2 Public Discontent and the Transfer of Governance Functions
To link the two challenges identified in subsection 2.1 I adopt an attitudinal approach.
This means that I do not analyze how effective transfers of governance functions im-
pact citizens’ support for nation-state democracy but rather how support for nation-state
democracy is linked to support for transferring governance functions to institutions that
operate “beyond the state”. There are numerous studies that investigate citizens’ atti-
tudes towards governance institutions “beyond the state” (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2011; Zürn,
2014; Owens and Sumner, 2016). However, mainly due to issues of data availability,
the majority of these studies analyzes citizens’ support for EU institutions and processes
at the European level (Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Recchi, 2008; Fuchs and Klingemann,
2011). Only few studies have analyzed such attitudes on other levels and in other con-
texts. Because of these limitations, I first elaborate on the arguments made with respect
to support for European integration and try to adapt them to the metropolitan context
in a second step.
Public Support for the Transfer of Governance Functions - The European
Debate
Public opinion scholars have proposed many different factors that influence citizens’ sup-
port for European integration and EU institutions. Apart from socio-demographic expla-
nations, scholars also include citizens’ nation-state context - and perceptions thereof - in
their analysis to explain support for European integration and EU institutions (Hooghe
and Marks, 2005; Fuchs, Magni-Berton and Roger, 2009; Sanders et al., 2012). Most of
these studies indeed find a link between perceptions and orientations towards the nation-
state level and support for European integration.
6This is not to say that effective output delivery by the nation-state is necessarily inhibited through
authority transfers. Such competence transfers can also increase the performance in a certain policy area
and some argue that they would not happen in the first place, if this was not the case (Moravcsik, 1993).
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Especially relevant for this paper are studies that analyze how support for European in-
tegration and EU institutions is linked citizens’ perceptions of nation-state institutions.
There are two answers to this question. The first one was proposed by Sánchez-Cuenca
(2000) and it is referred to as the “compensation” argument (Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet,
2011, 554). Here, the relationship between perceptions of national and European insti-
tutions is said to be a negative one. The more citizens are dissatisfied with nation-state
democracy, the more they are willing to transfer power to the European level. The pur-
ported reason is that "the worse the political system works at home and the better it works
at the supranational level, the smaller the risk involved in transferring national sovereignty
to a supranational body" (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000, 148). In line with this, Rohrschneider
(2002) argues that the quality of national institutions functions as the benchmark against
which citizens evaluate other institutions. The better nation-state institutions’ perfor-
mance is perceived, the more difficult it is for other levels to live up to this. Accordingly,
in this perspective support for European integration and EU institutions should be lower
when support for nation-state institutions is high.
The second answer assumes the opposite relationship and this is termed the “congru-
ence” argument, because citizens who support nation-state institutions are expected to
be supportive of institutions on other levels as well (Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011, 553).
Hobolt (2012), for example, argues that a positive spillover from support in nation-state
institutions towards EU institutions takes place. The reason for this is seen in the fact
that citizens - having less knowledge about European than national institutions - will
use "their attitudes towards national democratic institutions as a ’proxy’ when forming
opinions about EU democracy" (Hobolt, 2012; Anderson, 1998, 94). A similar argument
is made by Van Kersbergen (2000). He introduces the concept of "double allegiance"
(Van Kersbergen, 2000, 5) to the study of EU support. It consists of primary - the sup-
port of a public for the national system - and secondary allegiance - the support of that
same public for the European system. Citizens will only have a positive image of trans-
ferring governance functions if national welfare is increased - since that is the purported
argument made to do so in the first place (Fuchs, 2011b). If welfare indeed increases,
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this will not only have a positive effect support for nation-state institutions, but also for
European ones - and vice versa (Van Kersbergen, 2000, 12).
Public Support for Metropolitan Integration
How do these arguments translate to the context of metropolitan areas? To make this
argument transfer, I first introduce the concept of “metropolitan integration” and discuss
(the limits of) the analogy with European integration. In a second step I review the very
few studies that explain citizens’ orientations towards metropolitan areas and present two
hypotheses.
Metropolitan areas are functionally highly integrated spaces. They constitute a dense
network of physical, economic and social interactions. Yet, this “web of economic and
social structure is [...] by no means equalled by political interconnections” (Bromage,
1958). As this 60-year-old quote demonstrates, the debate on metropolitan governance
and governance reforms has quite a history (see Savitch and Vogel, 2009), yet to date
most of these areas remain fragmented in politico-administrative terms. With the term
“metropolitan integration” I refer - in analogy to European integration - to governance
reforms through which this political fragmentation is reduced. Put differently, it refers
to processes by which governance functions of nation-state institutions, in this case of
local and regional ones, are transferred to institutions that cover the whole or parts of
the metropolitan territory. Metropolitan integration can, thus, take on different forms.7
First, it can mean that a number of local governments cooperate in the provision of one
or several public services, e.g. waste disposal (Hulst and Van Montfort, 2007). Second,
metropolitan integration can mean that a number of local governments merge and thereby
create bigger and more consolidated municipalities (Heinelt and Kübler, 2005). Third,
and probably most prominently, metropolitan integration can refer to the creation of
metropolitan governments - new government tiers with directly elected representatives,
7In addition to the reforms described here, the political cohesion of metropolitan areas can also be
strengthened through the decentralization of governance functions from the national to the metropolitan
level (Kübler, 2012). In what follows, I only focus on bottom-up reforms and not on top-down reforms
like decentralization.
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that take on governance functions previously vested with local or regional governments
(Lefèvre, 1998; Frug, 2002). Finally, metropolitan integration can also mean that certain
governance functions are transferred from local governments to the next higher govern-
ment tier (when the territorial scope of this government tier coincides with the territorial
scope of the metropolitan area).
Taken together, these different reform types could be characterized as a “system of differ-
entiated integration” as Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (2013, 10) characterize
the EU and European integration. For two of these reforms, the analogy with Euro-
pean integration is straightforward. Inter-municipal cooperation can be equated with
international agreements, where nation-state actors remain the dominant players. The
introduction of a new tier with directly elected representatives also exists in the form of
the European parliament, and is embodied in a weaker form in many EU institutions such
as the European Commission or the European Court of Justice. For the other two reforms,
no direct analogies at the European level exist: A merger of two (or more) member states
has not occurred so far and is not very likely to do so in the near future. Centralization
also does not have a clear counterpart in European integration, although one could argue
that there’s a parallel when nation-state competences are transferred upward to already
existing European institutions. In sum, the commonality between metropolitan and Eu-
ropean integration does not predominantly lie in the specific ways of how competences
are transferred upwards, but more in the general aim of reducing political fragmentation
within a more or less clearly defined territory.
The aim of this paper is to link citizens’ support for metropolitan integration8 back to
their evaluation of nation-state democracy. With respect to this attitudinal dimension,
there are important differences between metropolitan and European integration. First,
compared to political integration at the European level, metropolitan integration is rather
unpoliticized (Hutter and Grande, 2014; Höglinger, 2016). While metropolitan space is
rutted by deep political cleavages in many established democracies (Sellers et al., 2013),
especially between suburbs and cities (Walks, 2006), the content of these cleavages is not
8See subsection 3.3 for details on operationalization.
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related to metropolitan integration. Neither among the general public nor among political
elites, there are clear-cut camps that support or oppose metropolitan integration. Public
opinion in this setting is not - or not to the same extent - influenced by public debates
and party cues on the issue (Steenbergen and Jones, 218-237). Rather, we are dealing
with a situation, in which citizens’ are to a large extent left to themselves and can rely
on party cues and political cleavages only to a limited extent when forming an opinion
(Oliver, 2012, 185).
This goes hand in hand with a second important caveat. As already mentioned before,
many metropolitan areas - while functionally integrated - are rather fragmented in polit-
ical terms. The extent of "metropolitan integration" is quite low in contrast to the extent
of European integration which is much more advanced (Hix, 2011). For the assessment of
citizens’ preferences, this means that usually one cannot ask about their attitudes towards
specific institutions as it is frequently done in research on European integration (Torcal,
Bonet and Costa Lobo, 2012). And even if such institutions exist - e.g. inter-municipal
cooperation arrangements or metropolitan governments - citizens lack knowledge about
them (Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015). Even in survey research in the European context, re-
searchers face the problem of item non-response when asking citizens about their attitudes
towards specific institutions and policies (Schoen, 2008). This is even more the case in a
metropolitan context. When there is comparatively little public debate on metropolitan
institutions they are not salient political objects. For an investigation of citizens’ support
for metropolitan integration, this means that one needs to rely on underlying principles
and rather general questions to grasp citizens’ attitudes.
For this reason, the few studies that analyze public attitudes towards metropolitan areas
and metropolitan issues measure rather general and diffuse orientations. On a very basic
level, Vallbé, Magre and Tomàs (2015) and Lackwoska and Mikuła (2015) assess citizens’
identification with the metropolitan area as a measure of their metropolitan orientation
(see also Kübler, 2005b, 2016). Furthermore, citizens’ political interest in inter-municipal
and supralocal politics is used as an indicator for their metropolitan orientation (Lid-
ström, 2015; Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015). On a more specific level, some authors assess
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citizens’ support for specific metropolitan policies, e.g. land-use planning (Mohamed,
2008) or intra-metropolitan tax distribution (Owens and Sumner, 2016). Finally, there
are studies that assess citizens’ support for specific reforms proposals - e.g. merging the
centre city of a metropolitan area with it’s surrounding parts or increasing inter-municipal
cooperation (Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015; Kübler, 2016).
For explaining variations in these attitudes, most scholars rely on socio-demographic fea-
tures, on general measures of political ideology and on local context conditions (Mohamed,
2008; Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015; Owens and Sumner, 2016). So far, there are almost
no studies that link citizens’ orientation towards the metropolitan level and their support
for certain metropolitan governance mechanisms to support for nation-state governance.
In a study of Swiss metropolitan areas, Kübler (2016, 18) finds that citizens strongly iden-
tifying with the metropolitan level are less satisfied with local democracy and concludes
that "[t]he emergence of city-regional orientations [...] seems to threaten the legitimacy of
the local state". By contrast, in a study of two Swedish city regions, Lidström (2015) finds
partial evidence for a positive relationship between citizens’ satisfaction with democracy
and their political orientation towards the inter-municipal level.
On a very basic level, these findings mirror the debate in research on support for Euro-
pean integration. On the one hand, Kübler (2016) finds evidence for a "compensation"-
mechanism. This can be explained by citizens’ perceived deficiencies of the "local state"
in delivering public services and the belief that other levels could do better. On the other
hand, Lidström (2015)’s evidence for the "congruence"-mechanism suggests that support
for nation-state democracy and institutions spills over to a more positive evaluation of
politics on the inter-municipal level and thus support for both nation-state democracy
and support for politics on other levels can be thought of as two aspects of the same
latent construct - namely a general affection or disaffection with politics (cf. Muñoz, Tor-
cal and Bonet, 2011). Taking up the argument from Hobolt (2012) and Muñoz, Torcal
and Bonet (2011) of national institutions being proxies for the evaluation of European,
the "congruence"-mechanism might be more likely to be observed, since the low politi-
cization of metropolitan integration and citizens’ limited knowledge about politics at the
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metropolitan level makes the use of proxies more likely. Nevertheless, I formulate two
hypotheses:
1. ”Compensation”-Hypothesis: The higher citizens’ support for subnational political
institutions, the lower their support for metropolitan integration.
2. ”Congruence”-Hypothesis: The higher citizens’ support for subnational political
institutions, the higher their support for metropolitan integration.
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3 Research Design
To test these hypotheses, I analyze citizens’ support for metropolitan integration in eight
metropolitan areas in Switzerland, Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK). In
this section, I first present the most different case selection logic together with the most
important case features. In a second step, I introduce the survey data used for the analysis
and I discuss the operationalization of "support for metropolitan integration" and "support
for subnational democracy". Finally, I briefly discuss why OLS-regression analysis is a
suitable way to put the hypotheses to a first test.
3.1 Case Selection
In Table 1 the reader finds an overview of the cases selected for the analysis, two metropoli-
tan areas in each of the four countries. They vary systematically on different important
dimensions that can impact citizens’ support for metropolitan integration and accord-
ingly the case selection logic corresponds to the most different cases design (Gerring,
2008). On the national level, the four countries vary in terms of their state structure.
Switzerland and Germany have a federal, France and the UK have a unitary structure.
Building on institutionalist theories for explaining political attitudes (see e.g. Anderson
and Guillory, 1997), we can expect citizens to have a stronger subnational orientations
in federal countries than in unitary ones. If citizens in these countries assign more im-
portance to the subnational level, they might be more reluctant to reform the existing
system and show lower support for metropolitan integration. The four countries also
differ with respect to the role of local governments in the multi-level system - i.e. their
local government system type. Hesse and Sharpe (1991) distinguish three types of local
government systems: the Anglo-Saxon one, where local governments have "a weak legal,
financial and political status" (John and Copus, 2011) but are important for delivering
public services, the Napoleonic model, where municipalities are strong in political terms
but weak in delivering services - i.e. in functional terms (Cole, 2011) and the North
Middle European model, where local governments are important both in political and
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functional terms (Benz and Zimmer, 2011; Ladner, 2011). Again, this institutional trait
might affect the importance citizens attribute to the local level and in turn their support
for metropolitan integration: When local government has a strong position in the multi-
level system of the nation-state, citizens might be more reluctant to accept reforms and
transfer competences.
For each country, the capital region as well as another major city-region was selected. Fit-
jar (2010) has shown that inter-regional differences exist with respect to the importance
citizens attribute to subnational state levels: Those living in the capital region identify
less with their region (compared to the national level) than citizens living in more periph-
eral regions (Fitjar, 2010, 536). With respect to support for metropolitan integration, this
could mean that there’s less of it in the non-capital regions. Furthermore, for each country
- except for Switzerland9 - a region with and one without a metropolitan government10
was selected. A metropolitan government is a strong form of metropolitan integration.
The presence or absence of such institutions could increase citizens’ support for metropoli-
tan integration, because they can already participate directly on the metropolitan level.
Finally, the eight metropolitan areas come in all sizes, from the Greater London area with
over 12,000,000 inhabitants to the rather small metropolitan area of Bern with its 360,000
inhabitants.
3.2 Data: An Online-Survey in 8 Metropolitan Areas
The data for this study stem from a large-N online-survey conducted in fall 2015 realized in
the eight metropolitan areas. The survey is part of a bigger research project on challenges
to democracy in the 21st century (NCCR Democracy, 2016). The general aim of the
survey is to identify citizen’s attitudes towards new forms of democracy “beyond the
state”.
9In Switzerland, no metropolitan area with a metropolitan government exists. One could argue,
however, that the metropolitan area of Zurich has a metropolitan government de facto, namely the canton,
since the functional extension of the metropolitan area coincides to a large extent with the politico-
administrative boundaries of the canton. Yet, the canton was not created to deal with metropolitan
problems but has a number of other tasks and goals, which is why this analogy is somewhat limited.
10See subsection 2.2 for definition
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Table 1: Case Selection: 8 Metropolitan Areas in 4 Countries
Country
State
Struc-
ture
Local Govern-
ment System
Type
Metropolitan
Area
Capital
City
Metropolitan
Govern-
ment
Population
(2012)
Switzerland Federal North MiddleEuropean
Bern Yes No 360,127
Zurich No No 1,217,751
Germany Federal North MiddleEuropean
Berlin Yes No 4,951,687
Stuttgart No Yes 2,647,134
France Unitary Napoleonic Lyon No Yes 1,934,717Paris Yes No 11,800,687
United
Kingdom Unitary Anglo-Saxon
London Yes Yes 12,208,100
Birmingham No No 2,873,800
The target population of the survey are individuals between 18-75 years of age that live
within the boundaries of the eight metropolitan areas, as defined by Urban Audit (2011).
The samples are stratified within metropolitan areas: The sample reflects the spatial
distribution of the target population in the metropolitan area: Respondents were selected
according to whether they live in the center city or in the surrounding zone. However,
the samples are not stratified between metropolitan areas, meaning that the population
size of an area is not reflected in the size of the sample. For each metropolitan area a
similar number of individuals was invited to participate in the survey (see Table 2). In
Germany, France and the UK, a quota sample strategy was chosen 11 and respondents
were recruited via online-access panels. For Bern and Zurich, the Swiss federal office
of statistics provided a random sample of addresses from their population registry. The
randomly selected individuals then received an invitation letter by mail with a link to
a website (and including an incentive) to participate in the online-survey. The response
rate for the Swiss sample amounts to almost 50%.
A total number of 5,044 respondents across the four countries participated in the
online-survey that took approximately 25 minutes to answer. Under exclusion of partic-
ipants with irregular response patterns (i.e. those with a large number of don’t know
answers or very uniform (block answer) response patterns) 4,895 respondents remain in
the sample.
11Due to financial restrictions.
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Table 2: Data: Spatial Distribution of Respondents Across Metropolitan Areas
Metropolitan Area Centre City Surrounding Total
Bern 187 (35%) 352 (65%) 539 (11%)
Zurich 171 (30%) 402 (70%) 573 (12%)
Berlin 491 (76%) 155 (23%) 646 (13%)
Stuttgart 151 (25%) 450 (75%) 601 (12%)
Lyon 187 (29%) 462 (71%) 649 (13%)
Paris 117 (19%) 507 (81%) 624 (13%)
London 219 (34%) 430 (66%) 649 (13%)
Birmingham 321 (52%) 293 (48%) 614 (13%)
Total 1844 (38%) 3051 (62%) 4895 (100%)
3.3 Operationalization
Dependent Variables: Support for Metropolitan Integration
There are different possibilities to operationalize citizens’ support for the political integra-
tion of a given territory. Studies analyzing the case of European integration can rely on a
variety of different measures: rather general and prospective indicators, such as support
for further integration of the EU (Rohrschneider, 2002; Roeder, 2011), citizens’ evaluation
of EU performance (Hobolt, 2012), and also citizens’ support for specific institutions (see
e.g. Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011). For the metropolitan level,
measures of performance and institutional evaluation are difficult to use as already dis-
cussed in subsection 2.2.12 Therefore, scholars investigating citizens’ orientations towards
the metropolitan level use citizens’ identification with this level (Lidström, 2015; Vallbé,
Magre and Tomàs, 2015), they ask about their support for more general principles of
metropolitan integration (Owens and Sumner, 2016), or assess citizens’ attitudes towards
specific reform proposals (Kübler, 2005a, 2016). In this paper, I build on the latter two
options and operationalize two concepts: i.) principles for metropolitan integration and
ii.) paths towards metropolitan integration. In Table 3 the reader finds an overview of
these two different concepts and the corresponding variables and survey items used to
measure them.
12An additional hurdle for comparative research is that the measures have to be similar across different
regions and countries. If citizens evaluate very context-specific institutions, it is difficult to compare their
evaluations across different regions and countries.
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On a more general level, I operationalize two principles that are important underlying
conditions for the political integration of metropolitan areas: On the one hand citizens
have to be willing to share their decision-making capacity over local issues with citizens in
other local governments and on the other hand citizens also have to be willing to share a
part of their local resources with citizens in other municipalities of the same area. To oper-
ationalize these two principles I adapt on two items from the European Social Survey and
from the Eurobarometer series. For "inter-municipal power-sharing" I transformed an item
from the ESS Round 6 (E16)13 and added the opposite statement. For "inter-municipal
resource-sharing" I transformed an item that was used in the early Eurobarometer series
to make it fit to the metropolitan context (Commission of the European Communities,
1985, 93).
For the regression analysis, I combine the survey items for each of the two variables and
z-standardize them. For inter-municipal power-sharing, I subtract respondents’ support
for statement B from their support for statement A. The result indicates citizens’ net
support for this principle of integration. For inter-municipal resource-sharing, I qualify
respondents’ support for statement A with their support for statement B. More precisely,
I multiply statement A with a transformation of the difference between statement A and
statement B14: The bigger the difference between statement A and statement B, the more
the value of statement A is adjusted in one or the other direction. This is done because
statement A asks about a general principle, while statement B checks whether respon-
dents would be willing to contribute to its realization. In other words, respondents are
’punished’ when their behavioral intentions contradict their stated values. This means
that the resulting variable, a fraction of the value for statement A, represents qualified
support for the second integration principle.
To operationalize what I call "paths to metropolitan integration" I build on an item pro-
posed by Kübler (2005a). It asks respondents about their support for four different types
13"How important do you think it is for democracy in general that national governments take into
account the views of other European governments before making decisions?" (European Social Survey,
2012).
14For a negative difference of -1, the value for A is multiplied by 0.9, for a difference of -2, it is multiplied
by 0.8; for a positive difference of 1, A is multiplied with 1.1, etc.
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of institutional reforms already introduced in subsection 2.2, all of which involve the
transfer of competences to another governance institution and all of which contribute to
the political integration of metropolitan areas. The four items are incorporated into the
regression analysis as one z-standardized indicator.15
In sum, I analyze three different dependent variables: i.) net support for inter-municipal
power-sharing; ii.) qualified support for inter-municipal resource-sharing and iii.) support
for metropolitan reforms. I tested whether these three variables are components of the
same latent scale, which is not the case: Cronbach’s α is rather low (.44) as well as the
correlations between the different variables. They, thus, seem to measure different aspects
of metropolitan integration and should be analyzed separately.
In Figure 1, the reader finds an overview of the distributions of the three dependent
variables across metropolitan areas. Generally, there are no strong differences across
metropolitan areas with respect to the univariate distributions, although the two British
metropolitan areas are a bit more favorable for inter-municipal resource-sharing.
Independent Variables: Support for Subnational Democracy
In contrast to measuring support for metropolitan integration, measuring support for
nation-state democracy has a long history and a widely accepted set of measures exists.
To measure support for nation-state democracy, I follow Norris (1999b) who suggested a
modification to the concept of diffuse and specific support developed by Easton (1965).
While Easton (1965, 171-220) distinguishes between three different objects of support (i.e.
the political community (most diffuse), the political regime and the political authorities
(most specific)), Norris (1999b) puts the three regime components identified by Easton
into a hierarchical order. Regime principles (i.e. the fundamental values on which a
system is based) are the most diffuse objects of support, followed by regime performance
(i.e. how the regime functions in practice) and regime institutions (i.e. how different
components of the regime function) (Norris, 1999b, 10-12).
In this paper, I confine the analysis to the two more specific objects of support, i.e.
15Cronbach’s α=.715 and a factor analysis yields one factor on which all items load higher than 0.68.
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Table 3: Operationalization: Support for Metropolitan Integration
Concept Variable Survey Item
Principles for
Metropolitan
Integration
Inter-municipal
Power-sharing
Agreement with following statements:
A. When making decisions, local politi-
cians should take into account the inter-
ests of other localities in the [X] region.
B. When making decisions, local politi-
cians should orient themselves solely and
exclusively towards the good of their own
locality.
[0-10]
Inter-municipal
Resource-sharing
Agreement with following statements:
A. When a locality in the [X] region is fac-
ing financial difficulties, it should be sup-
ported by the other localities via equalisa-
tion payments.
B. I would personally be ready to pay
higher taxes, to help other localities via
equalisation payments.
[0-10]
Paths towards
Metropolitan
Integration
Metropolitan
Reform Index
Support for the following reforms as a so-
lution to governance problems in the [X]
region:
A. the merger of several local authorities
into larger local authority areas
B. the cooperation of several local author-
ities in the corresponding problem areas
C. handing over the corresponding tasks
to the/a Metropolitan Government to de-
velop uniform solutions for the whole [X]
region
D. handing over the corresponding tasks
to the [next higher government tier]
[0-10]
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Figure 1: Boxplot: Distribution of Dependent Variables Across Metropolitan Areas
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Note. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.
regime performance and regime institutions. In Table 4 the reader finds a list of these
two different objects of support. To analyze the hypotheses stated in subsection 2.2,
I use citizens’ assessment of regime performance and regime institutions as a measure
of support for nation-state democracy. Regime performance "is commonly measured as
’satisfaction with the performance of democracy’" (Norris, 1999b, 11). In the online-survey,
this indicator was measured on four different levels. I only assess the impact of satisfaction
with subnational democracy, since metropolitan integration especially changes governance
on the local and the state/province16 level. For the measurement of support for regime
institutions, I rely on an item that measures trust in different institutions (Muñoz, Torcal
and Bonet, 2011). Again, I confine the analysis to support for subnational institutions,
16For the cases of France and the United Kingdom, the ’state/province’ level refers to the ’département’
and the ’county’ level, respectively.
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Table 4: Operationalization: Support for Subnational Democracy
Concept Variable Survey Item
Regime Performance Satisfaction with
Democracy
How satisfied are you with the way
democracy work...
A. in your local authority?
B. in your state/province?
C. in [country]?
D. in the EU?
[0-10]
Regime Institutions Trust in Institu-
tions
How much do you personally trust...
A. the [country] Parliament?
B. the [country] Government?
C. the legal system in [country]?
D. the media in [country]?
E. the state/province government?
F. the state/province parliament?
G. local government?
H. the United Nations?
I. scientists / academic experts?
[0-10]
since these are the most proximate ones to the metropolitan level. For both satisfaction
with subnational democracy and trust in subnational institutions, I assessed whether the
respective items form one scale. This is the case, Cronbach’s α equals 0.934 (satisfaction)
and 0.953 respectively. Each respondents mean over the respective items is calculated
and the resulting variable is z-standardized.
Again, Figure 2 displays the univariate distributions of the two independent variables
across metropolitan areas. In contrast to the dependent variables, there is some variation
both across and within countries: Citizens in the two Swiss metropolitan areas are both
more trustful and more satisfied with subnational democracy than citizens in the other
three countries. Furthermore, respondents in Berlin are both less satisfied and less trustful
of subnational institutions than their fellow countrymen in Stuttgart.
Control Variables
I also include a set of control variables that can be relevant for an analysis of support
for metropolitan integration and political support more generally. Apart from socio-
demographic variables (age, gender, education and income) that were found to be as-
sociated with a variety of political attitudes and behavior (see e.g. Brady, Verba and
Schlozman, 1995) I include a dummy-variable that indicates whether a respondent lives
23
Figure 2: Boxplot: Distribution of Independent Variables Across Metropolitan Areas
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Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy
Trust: Subnational Institutions
in the centre city or in the surrounding of the metropolitan area (assessed via their postal
code). Respondents living in the centre city might be more supportive of metropolitan
integration: Since their place of residence forms the centre of the metropolitan area, they
can expect that further integration also means that more power is transferred to the cen-
tre. Finally, I include additional perception measures, such as respondents’ self-placement
on a left-right scale (as a very basic measure of political ideology), their overall stated
political interest and a measure for their feeling of external and internal political efficacy
on the local level. 17 An overview of descriptive statistics for all the indicators can be
found in Table A1.
17The items for this measure are adapted to the local level from a short scale developed by GESIS
(2016). The scale consists of four items. A factor analysis clearly yielded two factors that correspond to
the concepts of external and internal efficacy.
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3.4 Methodology
To analyze the two hypotheses stated in subsection 2.2 I rely on standard OLS-regression
techniques, since the dependent variables are all indexes of several variables and they
can be treated as interval-scaled. An issue with the use of standard OLS-regression is
the hierarchical structure of the data. In this case one should normally use multi-level
regression analysis to account for the variance at higher levels (Steenbergen and Jones,
218-237). However, the few numbers of level-2 units (i.e. metropolitan areas) and the
even fewer number of level-3 units (i.e. countries) does not permit to use this technique.
Therefore, I use a dummy variable approach (for both metropolitan areas and countries)
to capture the variation induced by the two higher levels.18
I proceed in two steps to analyze the relationship between support for metropolitan inte-
gration and support for subnational democracy. In a first step, I calculate OLS-regression
models for the whole sample metropolitan area- and country-dummies. In a second step
I run the same models for the eight regions and the four countries separately to establish
a more detailed picture of the relationship between the dependent and the independent
variables.
Two general problems associated with survey research are on the one hand a potential
bias in the sample compared to the target population and on the other hand non-response
or “don’t know” answers of participants for individual items. To cope with the first issue,
one can generate survey weights (based on indicators that are available for both survey
participants and the target population) and “mirror” the target population with these
indicators. For this survey, weights were calculated based on age, gender, education and
occupational status. A comparison of the weighted and the non-weighted distributions of
the three dependent variables can be found in Figure A1, Figure A2 and Figure A3 in the
appendix. The distributions of the three variables do not substantially differ across the
weighted and the non-weighted sample.19
18A robustness check in the form of a multi-level regression with the eight metropolitan areas as level-2
units and dummy variables for the country level yields essentially the same results as the dummy variable
approach.
19An additional estimation of the regression models of the general analysis (Table A2) yields essentially
the same results as for the non-weighted sample.
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With respect to the second issue, the online-setting allows to force respondents to answer
each question. However, respondents were given a “don’t know” option for attitudinal
questions. For the OLS-regression models, respondents that ticked the “don’t know” op-
tion for one of the items used in the analysis are deleted listwise. In Table A1 the reader
finds four dummy variables20 that distinguish respondents with respect to whether they
gave an opinion on an item or whether they used the “don’t know” option. For all three
dependent variables taken together, the number of “don’t know” answers amounts to
14.2%. To test whether respondents using the “don’t know” option for one of these items
systematically differ from the other respondents, I estimated a logistic regression model
with the same variables as in the OLS-regression models (see Table A3). With respect
to socio-demographic variables, the results show that especially female respondents and
those with low education and little income are more likely to tick the “don’t know” cat-
egory. Furthermore, respondents feeling less politically efficacious on the local level are
also more likely to tick this category. However, the two independent variables are not
significantly correlated with having an opinion on metropolitan integration or not, even
though the negative coefficient for trust in subnational democracy is rather big and close
to being significant with 95% confidence.
20One for each dependent variable and one for all dependent variables taken together
26
4 Results
4.1 General Analysis: Support for Metropolitan Integration
How is support for subnational democracy linked to support for metropolitan integration?
Is there evidence for the compensation mechanism, meaning a negative relationship, or
does the observed pattern rather reflect a congruence between the two variables, meaning
a positive relationship? A first answer to these questions can be found in the coefficients
plot in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Figure 3 shows the effects of satisfaction with subnational
Figure 3: Coefficients Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Satisfaction with
Subnational Democracy
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy
Female(=1)
Age in Years
Medium
High
Medium
High
High
Local External Pol. Efficacy
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy
Left-Right Self-Placement
Centre City(=1)
Zurich
Berlin
Stuttgart
Lyon
Paris
London
Birmingham
DE
FR
UK
Education (Baseline=low)
Income (Baseline=low)
Pol. Interest (Baseline=low)
Region (Baseline=Bern)
Country (Baseline=CH)
-.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5
IMPS: Net Support (1) IMRS: Qualified Support (1) Metro. Reform Index (1)
OLS-Estimates
Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized beta coefficients with 95% confidence interval.
Corresponding models can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-
Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.
democracy on the three dependent variables “Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-
Sharing”, “Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing” and “Support for
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Metropolitan Reform”. Respondents that are more satisfied with subnational democ-
racy show significantly higher support for two of the three dependent variables (sup-
port for resource-sharing and support for metropolitan reform), which corroborates the
“congruence”-hypothesis. Most of the socio-demographic control variables do not yield
significant effects, except for highly educated respondents being slightly more supportive
of inter-municipal power-sharing and women being a little less supportive of resource-
sharing and metropolitan reforms. With respect to the control variables measuring other
political attitudes, the figure especially shows the relevance of political efficacy for being
more or less supportive of metropolitan integration. However, the effects of external and
internal political efficacy differ across the three dependent variables. Being on the right
of the political spectrum significantly decreases support for the two integration princi-
ples but not for metropolitan reform. Finally, respondents living in the centre city of a
metropolitan area show moderately higher support for metropolitan integration.
The results for the second independent variable depicted in Figure 4 support this pic-
ture. Respondents with higher trust in subnational institutions are more supportive of
metropolitan integration - again with the exception for power-sharing - which lends addi-
tional support to the “congruence”-hypothesis. The other indicators remain by and large
the same.
4.2 Cross-National and Cross-Regional Comparison
What becomes evident from both Figure 3 and Figure 4 is that respondents differ in
their support for metropolitan integration both across the eight metropolitan areas and
across the four countries. Especially on the country level there are significant differences
with respect to the support for metropolitan integration. While German, French and
British respondents are less supportive of power-sharing than Swiss ones, they are more
supportive of resource-sharing and of metropolitan reform. In this subsection I assess
whether the relationship between support for subnational democracy and support for
metropolitan integration differs across these contexts.
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Figure 4: Coefficients Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Trust in Subna-
tional Institutions
Trust: Subnational Institutions
Female(=1)
Age in Years
Medium
High
Medium
High
High
Local External Pol. Efficacy
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy
Left-Right Self-Placement
Centre City(=1)
Zurich
Berlin
Stuttgart
Lyon
Paris
London
Birmingham
DE
FR
UK
Education (Baseline=low)
Income (Baseline=low)
Pol. Interest (Baseline=low)
Region (Baseline=Bern)
Country (Baseline=CH)
-.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5
IMPS: Net Support (2) IMRS: Qualified Support (2) Metro. Reform Index (2)
OLS-Estimates
Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized beta coefficients with 95% confidence interval.
Corresponding models can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-
Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the coefficients for satisfaction with subnational democ-
racy and trust in subnational institutions for each of the four countries. While the general
pattern from subsection 4.1 is confirmed - a significant positive relationship between sup-
port for subnational democracy and two of the three dependent variables - the effects
of subnational democracy on support for metropolitan integration vary across countries.
It becomes evident that the relation is stronger in France and the UK and weaker in
Switzerland and Germany. Furthermore, the effects of trust in subnational institutions
are generally stronger than those of satisfaction with subnational democracy. The latter
coefficient is even insignificant in Switzerland for all three dependent variables.
A similar picture emerges when turning to the eight different metropolitan areas. Fig-
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Figure 5: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Satisfaction with
Subnational Democracy by Country
-.2 0 .2 .4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.2 0 .2 .4
IMPS: Net Support IMRS: Qualified Support Metropolitan Reform Index
CH DE FR UK
Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democ-
racy for individual countries. Full regression models can be found in Table A4, Table A5
and Table A6 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal
Resource-Sharing.
ure 7 and Figure 8 show the coefficients for the independent variables across the eight
regions. Again, the coefficients are not significant when it comes to inter-municipal power-
sharing (except for Paris) but more so when it comes to resource-sharing and support for
metropolitan reform. The relationship is stronger in the French and the British metropoli-
tan areas and generally the impact of trust in subnational institutions is a bit stronger.
For the metropolitan areas of Bern and Stuttgart, the effects are not or only marginally
significant.
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Figure 6: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Trust in Subna-
tional Institutions by Country
-.2 0 .2 .4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.2 0 .2 .4
IMPS: Net Support IMRS: Net Support Metropolitan Reform Index
CH DE FR UK
Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democ-
racy for individual regions. Full regression models can be found in Table A7, Table A8
and Table A9 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal
Resource-Sharing.
Figure 7: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Satisfaction with
Subnational Democracy by Metropolitan Area
-.2 0 .2 .4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.2 0 .2 .4
IMPS: Net Support IMRS: Qualified Support Metropolitan Reform Index
Bern Zurich Berlin Stuttgart Paris Lyon London Birmingham
Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democ-
racy for individual regions. Full regression models can be found in Table A10, Table A11
and Table A12 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal
Resource-Sharing.
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Figure 8: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Trust in Subna-
tional Institutions by Metropolitan Area
-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
IMPS: Net Support IMRS: Qualified Support Metropolitan Reform Index
Bern Zurich Berlin Stuttgart Paris Lyon London Birmingham
Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democ-
racy for individual regions. Full regression models can be found in Table A13, Table A14
and Table A15 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal
Resource-Sharing.
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5 Discussion
What can these results tell us about support for metropolitan integration and how do
they link to the debates in the European context? Notwithstanding some caveats, one
can state that the results corroborate the “congruence”-mechanism. For two of three de-
pendent variables, the link between support for subnational democracy and support for
metropolitan integration is generally positive and significant. Furthermore, the effects of
trust in subnational institutions are stronger than those for satisfaction with subnational
democracy.
For both inter-municipal resource-sharing and support for metropolitan reform, trust in
subnational institutions has a stronger effect than satisfaction with subnational democ-
racy. Moreover, in both cases feelings of local external political efficacy have a positive
effect on support. This suggests that a generally positive stance towards democratic pol-
itics can make citizens less risk averse and more supportive of changing the status quo.
While the evidence for these two dependent variables is rather clear, they are more in-
conclusive for inter-municipal power-sharing. Support for subnational democracy is not
significantly linked to support for this principle of metropolitan integration. One potential
explanation for this finding is what the literature on European integration calls "cogni-
tive mobilization" (Fuchs, 2011a, 224): Citizens that are more knowledgeable and more
confident about their capabilities for participating in politics are also more supportive
of potentially making the existing system more complex by introducing additional ele-
ments and mechanisms of multi-level governance. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the
highly educated and those feeling confident about their political capabilities vis-à-vis the
local level (high internal political efficacy) are more supportive of inter-municipal power-
sharing. This finding coud be explained by the fact that this is the most abstract of
the three dependent variables: A stronger cognitive effort is needed to think of a specific
situation in which inter-municipal power-sharing becomes meaningful.
Comparing the results across different context shows that the extent of support for
metropolitan integration especially varies across countries (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).
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There are no strong differences among metropolitan areas in the same country, except
for respondents in Zurich and Paris. They are significantly less supportive of metropoli-
tan reform or respectively of inter-municipal power-sharing than their fellow countrymen
in Bern and Lyon. The effects of support for subnational democracy on support for
metropolitan integration are less pronounced in the two federal countries than in the two
unitary ones (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). This qualifies the overall findings to a certain
extent, since the relationship is less pronounced in those contexts, where the subnational
level matters more in the daily life of the citizens (Benz and Zimmer, 2011; Ladner, 2011).
For French and British citizens with a more subnational orientation, metropolitan integra-
tion might be seen as a way to strengthen the subnational level compared to the national
one, whereas for Swiss and German citizens, the metropolitan level might also be seen as
a competition to nation-state governance on the subnational level.
The different effect sizes of support for subnational democracy across metropolitan areas
are more difficult to explain. While the smaller effect size in federal countries is also
reproduced at this level, some individual deviations (e.g. Birmingham for inter-municipal
resoure-sharing or Stuttgart for metropolitan reform) remain puzzling. This has to be
explored further in a next step.21
In sum, the results speak to more recent studies on support for European integration,
which argue that evaluations of nation-state democracy function as a reference point for
the evaluation of European Union institutions (Hobolt, 2012; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet,
2011; Torcal, Bonet and Costa Lobo, 2012). However, an important difference is that the
dependent variables analyzed in this paper are not evaluations of existing institutions but
rather associated with the latter’s creation. This might be interpreted in the sense that
a positive evaluation of nation-state politics is an expression of more positive evaluations
of politics in general - which goes along with support for reforming and transforming ex-
isting governance arrangements: When citizens trust their representatives and think that
the democratic system works well in general, this seems to go along with the belief that
21A disaggregated analysis of the four items that measure metropolitan reform shows for example that
in areas with a metropolitan government (i.e. Stuttgart, Lyon and London) support for transferring
competences to a metropolitan government is significantly higher than in the other regions
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reforms can strengthen and do not weaken the system.
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6 Conclusion
This paper started out with two challenges modern democracies face - decline of public
support for democratic institutions and the transfer of governance functions away from
nation-state institutions - and aimed at assessing their relationship through the analysis
of citizens’ attitudes in a specific context: How is support for subnational democracy
linked to support for metropolitan integration?
The results suggest that citizens’ political support for the subnational state is congruent
with their support for the political integration of metropolitan areas. When citizens
are confident about politics in nation-state institutions, they are more confident about
transferring competences and making changes to the status quo.
The paper has some important limitations, however. First, the present version of this
paper lacks measures for the local context a respondent resides in. However, existing
research on local political attitudes, local-level indicators such as the size, socio-economic
structure and geographical location of a municipality were found to covary systematically
with citizens’ political attitudes (Denk, 2012; Lidström, 2013; Denters et al., 2014).22 An
inclusion of such indicators will also strengthen the links of the paper to the literature on
support for European integration, since scholars in this field emphasize the impact of the
national context, e.g. in the form of economic performance and quality of governance, on
support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Fuchs, 2011b; Muñoz, Torcal
and Bonet, 2011).
Second, the theoretical argument of the paper heavily relies on research on support for
European integration. Admittedly, this analogy has severe limitations. For one, the
issue at stake - i.e. European or metropolitan integration respectively - varies greatly in
the extent to which it is politicized in public debates and mobilized by political parties
(Hutter and Grande, 2014; Hasler and Kübler, 2016; Höglinger, 2016). Moreover, the
political communities affected by these two types of integration differ substantially in
22Data collection on these indicators is still under way. In addition to these structural indicators, the
extent to which a municipality is participating in area-wide or least supra-local governance schemes would
be an important control measure. However, such information is difficult to obtain and its measurement
and quality varies widely across different contexts.
36
the extent to which individuals feel attached to them: While local attachment can be a
source of mobilization in some cases (Baldersheim and Rose, 2010), national attachment
and identification is much more salient than local one (Antonsich and Holland, 2014) and
accordingly European integration faces much stronger resistance than metropolitan one.
Finally, the institutional context conditions are very different: Integrating a policy at
the European level requires a much bigger efforts by much more actors than integrating
a policy at the metropolitan level, where this is usually a more technical than political
or politicized issue. Despite these limitations, there’s also a potential benefit of testing
integration-support theories in the metropolitan context. Doing so offers the advantage
of comparison: Support for integration can be compared across different political and
institutional contexts that share basic functional conditions, namely a dense web of social,
economic and cultural interactions that requires governance in one or the other form.
Overall, the findings of this study suggest - in line with recent research on support for
European integration (Hobolt, 2012) - that public discontent with nation-state democracy
spills over to governance "beyond the state" as well. To find out whether the causal effect
works that way - as suggested by some scholars (Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011) - or
whether the actual transfer of governance functions to institutions and bodies "beyond
the state" causes public discontent - as suggested by others (Putnam, Pharr and Dalton,
2000) is left to future research.
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Appendices
Figure A1: Histogram: Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing: Net Support
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Figure A2: Histogram: Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing: Qualified Support
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Figure A3: Histogram: Metropolitan Reform Index
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P50 P75
Dependent Variables
Inter-Municipal Power-
Sharing: Net Supporta 4747 .006 1.004 -2.998 2.193 -.402 -.143 .636
Inter-Municipal Resource-
Sharing: Qualified
Supporta
4540 -.007 .996 -1.746 2.344 -.764 -.028 .708
Metropolitan Reform
Indexa 4396 -.002 .996 -3.075 2.152 -.592 .062 .715
Independent Variables
Satisfaction: Subnational
Democracya 4670 .002 .994 -2.52 1.718 -.401 .235 .658
Trust: Subnational
Institutionsa 4465 .001 .994 -2.223 1.977 -.543 .157 .717
Control Variables
Female(=1) 4888 .494 .5 0 1 0 0 1
Age in Years 4895 45.239 14.501 18 79 33 45 57
Education: 3 categories 4895 1.352 .706 0 2 1 1 2
Income: 3 categories 4895 1.035 .763 0 2 0 1 2
Interest in Politics, General 4860 .712 .453 0 1 0 1 1
Local External Pol. Effi-
cacy 4665 -.001 .997 -1.697 3.281 -.866 -.032 .728
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 4665 .021 .985 -2.948 1.929 -.592 .113 .725
Left-Right Self-Placement 4384 5.303 2.647 0 10 3 5 7
Centre City(=1) 4895 .377 .485 0 1 0 0 1
Missing Values (DK)
Inter-Municipal Power-
Sharing: Net Support
(DK=1)
4895 .03 .171 0 1 0 0 0
Inter-Municipal Resource-
Sharing: Qualified Support
(DK=1)
4895 .073 .259 0 1 0 0 0
Metropolitan Reform Index
(DK=1) 4895 .102 .303 0 1 0 0 0
All Dependent Variables
(DK=1) 4895 .142 .349 0 1 0 0 0
Note. Obs.=Number of Observations, Std. Dev.=Standard Deviation, Min=Minimum,
Max=Maximum, P25=25th percentile, P50=Median, P75=75th percentile.
a z-standardized variable.
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Table A2: OLS-Regression: Support for Metropolitan Integration
Inter-Municipal
Power-Sharing:
Net Support
Inter-Municipal
Resource-
Sharing: Quali-
fied Support
Metropolitan
Reform Index
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
β β β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Satisfaction: Subnational
Democracy
0.027 0.133∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.000) (0.000)
Trust: Subnational Institu-
tions
0.021 0.222∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.000) (0.000)
Female(=1) -0.011 -0.016 -0.057 -0.059
∗ -0.086∗∗ -0.085∗∗
(0.729) (0.611) (0.054) (0.047) (0.005) (0.006)
Age in Years 0.002
∗ 0.003∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
(Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.047 -0.049 -0.025 -0.020 0.001 0.016(0.378) (0.361) (0.618) (0.690) (0.984) (0.759)
Edu. High 0.127
∗ 0.123∗ 0.059 0.052 0.080 0.073
(0.016) (0.021) (0.240) (0.302) (0.121) (0.158)
Income
(Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium 0.028 0.026 -0.003 0.029 0.046 0.065(0.473) (0.506) (0.935) (0.442) (0.230) (0.090)
Inc. High 0.070 0.071 -0.054 -0.031 0.042 0.054(0.102) (0.104) (0.184) (0.455) (0.321) (0.197)
Political Interest
(Baseline=Low)
Int. High -0.030 -0.035 0.221
∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.088∗
(0.470) (0.412) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.032)
Local External Pol. Effi-
cacy
-0.010 -0.010 0.283∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.584) (0.591) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 0.091
∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ -0.042∗ -0.036∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.069
∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.885) (0.701)
Centre City(=1) 0.073
∗ 0.078∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.023) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Metropolitan Area
(Baseline=Bern)
Zurich -0.098 -0.103 -0.079 -0.057 -0.198
∗∗ -0.193∗∗
(0.122) (0.112) (0.185) (0.344) (0.001) (0.002)
Berlin -0.052 -0.052 0.000 0.000 -0.114 -0.082(0.394) (0.404) (0.057) (0.171)
Continued on next page
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Table A2 – Continued
Inter-Municipal
Power-Sharing:
Net Support
Inter-Municipal
Resource-
Sharing: Quali-
fied Support
Metropolitan
Reform Index
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
β β β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Stuttgart omit. omit. -0.063 -0.080 omit. omit.(0.283) (0.172)
Lyon 0.183
∗∗ omit. omit. -0.014 omit. -0.030
(0.002) (0.804) (0.615)
Paris omit. -0.184
∗∗ 0.003 omit. -0.014 omit.
(0.003) (0.963) (0.807)
London omit. -0.085 omit. -0.010 omit. 0.084(0.174) (0.861) (0.160)
Birmingham 0.040 omit. -0.028 omit. -0.155
∗∗ 0.000
(0.512) (0.627) (0.008)
Country
(Baseline=CH)
DE -0.374
∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ 0.113 0.103 0.259∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.090) (0.000) (0.001)
FR -0.209
∗∗ -0.058 0.216∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.371) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UK -0.334
∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.131∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.041)
Constant 0.401
∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.217∗ 0.231∗ 0.009 0.025
(0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.015) (0.922) (0.799)
N 4003 3844 3863 3716 3792 3672
Adjusted-R2 0.078 0.082 0.205 0.231 0.150 0.169
F-Test 18.706∗∗∗ 19.154∗∗∗ 53.319∗∗∗ 59.599∗∗∗ 36.194∗∗∗ 40.388∗∗∗
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata.
Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). omit.: Coefficient omitted;
region=country intercept.
Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.
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Table A3: Logistic Regression: Missing Values (DK=1) for Support for Metropolitan
Integration
Socio-Demographic Model Satisfaction Model Trust Model
β β β
(p>|z|) (p>|z|) (p>|z|)
Female(=1) 0.721
∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age in Years -0.002 0.004 0.006(0.402) (0.272) (0.131)
Education (Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.334
∗∗ -0.123 -0.223
(0.008) (0.471) (0.204)
Edu. High -0.413
∗∗ -0.196 -0.315
(0.001) (0.254) (0.075)
Income (Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium -0.401
∗∗∗ -0.264∗ -0.111
(0.000) (0.042) (0.425)
Inc. High -0.584
∗∗∗ -0.293∗ -0.177
(0.000) (0.049) (0.268)
Centre City(=1) 0.075 0.112 0.131(0.416) (0.348) (0.304)
Satisfaction: Subnational
Democracy
-0.020
(0.751)
Trust: Subnational Institu-
tions
-0.132
(0.054)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)
Int. High -0.221 -0.083(0.102) (0.572)
Local External Pol. Effi-
cacy
-0.176∗∗ -0.228∗∗
(0.007) (0.002)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy -0.210
∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.043
∗ -0.054∗
(0.039) (0.015)
Metropolitan Area (Baseline=Bern)
Zurich -0.017 -0.234 -0.292(0.931) (0.328) (0.257)
Berlin 0.269 0.028 -0.131(0.130) (0.900) (0.578)
Stuttgart 0.078 -0.145 -0.172(0.671) (0.526) (0.473)
Lyon 0.196 -0.145 -0.501(0.269) (0.525) (0.052)
Paris 0.121 -0.175 -0.317(0.509) (0.451) (0.204)
Continued on next page
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Table A3 – Continued
Socio-Demographic Model Satisfaction Model Trust Model
β β β
(p>|z|) (p>|z|) (p>|z|)
London 0.439
∗ 0.178 0.190
(0.011) (0.415) (0.407)
Birmingham 0.081 -0.273 -0.282(0.655) (0.251) (0.259)
Country (Baseline=CH)
DE omit. omit. omit.
FR omit. omit. omit.
UK omit. omit. omit.
Constant -1.648
∗∗∗ -1.955∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 4888 4060 3896
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.042 0.050
χ2 161.566∗∗∗ 108.511∗∗∗ 117.603∗∗∗
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with binary logistic regression (-logistic-)
in Stata. Entries are logit coefficients (p-values in parentheses). omit.: Coefficient
omitted, country=baseline
Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.
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Table A4: OLS-Regression: Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing and Satis-
faction with Subnational Democracy by Country
Switzerland Germany France United Kingdom
β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy -0.006 -0.011 0.118
∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.905) (0.760) (0.001) (0.948)
Female(=1) -0.056 -0.016 -0.100 0.098(0.443) (0.812) (0.098) (0.057)
Age in Years 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001(0.079) (0.400) (0.226) (0.517)
Education (Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.170 0.162 -0.118 -0.027(0.277) (0.126) (0.397) (0.728)
Edu. High 0.103 0.312
∗∗ 0.052 0.039
(0.527) (0.005) (0.712) (0.552)
Income (Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium 0.171 -0.004 -0.013 0.039(0.066) (0.956) (0.867) (0.551)
Inc. High 0.336
∗∗ 0.015 -0.008 0.009
(0.001) (0.860) (0.929) (0.896)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)
Int. High 0.004 -0.018 -0.050 -0.032(0.967) (0.840) (0.497) (0.657)
Local External Pol. Efficacy 0.077 0.090
∗ -0.086∗ -0.086∗∗
(0.074) (0.019) (0.012) (0.003)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 0.064 0.094
∗ 0.085∗ 0.091∗∗
(0.201) (0.015) (0.018) (0.003)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.101
∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Centre City(=1) 0.120 0.076 0.070 -0.007(0.119) (0.305) (0.311) (0.894)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern) -0.085(0.222)
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart) -0.076(0.298)
Lyon (Baseline=Paris) 0.177
∗∗
(0.003)
Birmingham (Baseline=London) -0.019(0.719)
Constant 0.348 -0.058 0.247 0.092(0.116) (0.756) (0.209) (0.554)
N 914 1050 1015 1024
Adjusted-R2 0.109 0.044 0.065 0.048
F-Test 9.573 4.720 6.433 5.005
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata.
Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05
**<0.01 ***<0.001. 51
Table A5: OLS-Regression: Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing and
Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Country
Switzerland Germany France United Kingdom
β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy -0.021 0.090
∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.597) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Female(=1) -0.109 -0.061 -0.141
∗ 0.027
(0.073) (0.280) (0.015) (0.655)
Age in Years -0.001 -0.009
∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.014∗∗∗
(0.503) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.040 0.135 -0.163 -0.131(0.757) (0.140) (0.217) (0.150)
Edu. High -0.004 0.232
∗ -0.055 0.006
(0.975) (0.016) (0.677) (0.935)
Income (Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium -0.038 -0.027 0.049 -0.009(0.616) (0.693) (0.516) (0.910)
Inc. High 0.108 -0.088 -0.080 -0.181
∗
(0.208) (0.235) (0.337) (0.035)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)
Int. High 0.167
∗ 0.129 0.230∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.091) (0.001) (0.000)
Local External Pol. Efficacy 0.185
∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 0.007 -0.054 -0.098
∗∗ 0.016
(0.860) (0.107) (0.005) (0.670)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.091
∗∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.020
(0.000) (0.025) (0.001) (0.104)
Centre City(=1) 0.066 0.134
∗ 0.135∗ 0.055
(0.303) (0.035) (0.042) (0.376)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern) -0.088(0.126)
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart) 0.034(0.594)
Lyon (Baseline=Paris) 0.015(0.789)
London (Baseline=Birmingham) 0.032(0.611)
Constant 0.359 0.230 0.343 0.851
∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.154) (0.069) (0.000)
N 888 1018 996 961
Adjusted-R2 0.118 0.199 0.201 0.251
F-Test 10.146 20.492 20.254 25.683
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata.
Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05
**<0.01 ***<0.001. 52
Table A6: OLS-Regression: Metropolitan Reform Index and Satisfaction with Subna-
tional Democracy by Country
Switzerland Germany France United Kingdom
β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy 0.048 0.113
∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Female(=1) -0.206
∗∗ -0.124∗ -0.146∗ 0.049
(0.001) (0.040) (0.019) (0.385)
Age in Years -0.007
∗∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.049) (0.971) (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.058 0.058 -0.201 0.048(0.675) (0.553) (0.153) (0.567)
Edu. High 0.061 0.039 -0.046 0.086(0.669) (0.704) (0.745) (0.242)
Income (Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium 0.105 0.028 -0.050 0.096(0.180) (0.707) (0.537) (0.181)
Inc. High 0.177
∗ -0.020 -0.066 0.032
(0.045) (0.801) (0.460) (0.687)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)
Int. High 0.024 0.078 0.232
∗∗ 0.050
(0.774) (0.341) (0.002) (0.536)
Local External Pol. Efficacy 0.120
∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 0.056 0.144
∗∗∗ 0.023 0.092∗∗
(0.185) (0.000) (0.534) (0.007)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.060
∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.013 0.051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.851) (0.191) (0.000)
Centre City(=1) 0.072 0.198
∗∗ 0.045 0.057
(0.268) (0.004) (0.528) (0.321)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern) -0.201
∗∗∗
(0.001)
Stuttgart (Baseline=Berlin) 0.188
∗∗
(0.006)
Lyon (Baseline=Paris) 0.050(0.411)
London (Baseline=Birmingham) 0.141
∗
(0.014)
Constant 0.533
∗∗ -0.021 0.230 -0.004
(0.006) (0.907) (0.253) (0.983)
N 868 989 961 974
Adjusted-R2 0.112 0.105 0.120 0.327
F-Test 9.390 9.957 11.104 37.355
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata.
Entries are OLS-coefficients. (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05
**<0.01 ***<0.001. 53
Table A7: OLS-Regression: Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing and Trust
in Subnational Institutions by Country
Switzerland Germany France United Kingdom
β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Trust: Subnational Institutions 0.051 -0.003 0.069
∗ -0.021
(0.348) (0.938) (0.048) (0.500)
Female(=1) -0.045 -0.038 -0.095 0.102(0.544) (0.566) (0.123) (0.051)
Age in Years 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001(0.103) (0.630) (0.092) (0.450)
Education (Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.163 0.174 -0.155 -0.025(0.292) (0.108) (0.267) (0.744)
Edu. High 0.141 0.318
∗∗ -0.005 0.037
(0.383) (0.005) (0.974) (0.579)
Income (Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium 0.175 -0.009 0.006 0.022(0.063) (0.906) (0.943) (0.743)
Inc. High 0.320
∗∗ -0.005 0.049 -0.004
(0.002) (0.956) (0.580) (0.951)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)
Int. High 0.012 -0.036 -0.052 -0.034(0.905) (0.686) (0.490) (0.644)
Local External Pol. Efficacy 0.045 0.084
∗ -0.066 -0.080∗∗
(0.317) (0.040) (0.066) (0.008)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 0.050 0.096
∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(0.317) (0.014) (0.005) (0.001)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.106
∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Centre City(=1) 0.110 0.083 0.057 0.017(0.162) (0.266) (0.426) (0.742)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern) -0.090(0.206)
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart) -0.074(0.322)
Lyon (Baseline=Paris) 0.187
∗∗
(0.002)
Birmingham (Baseline=London) 0.049(0.351)
Constant 0.373 -0.020 0.216 0.062(0.093) (0.917) (0.278) (0.695)
N 876 1029 976 963
Adjusted-R2 0.117 0.040 0.063 0.057
F-Test 9.897 4.333 6.018 5.508
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata.
Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05
**<0.01 ***<0.001. 54
Table A8: OLS-Regression: Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing and
Trust in Subnational Institutions by Country
Switzerland Germany France United Kingdom
β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Trust: Subnational Institutions 0.135
∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female(=1) -0.118 -0.071 -0.119
∗ 0.010
(0.055) (0.205) (0.042) (0.872)
Age in Years -0.002 -0.010
∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.013∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.000) (0.083) (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.078 0.131 -0.119 -0.078(0.541) (0.158) (0.362) (0.401)
Edu. High -0.018 0.215
∗ -0.048 0.008
(0.892) (0.027) (0.714) (0.917)
Income (Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium -0.021 -0.009 0.097 0.031(0.791) (0.898) (0.201) (0.697)
Inc. High 0.093 -0.088 -0.032 -0.101(0.287) (0.236) (0.701) (0.243)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)
Int. High 0.151 0.109 0.138 0.266
∗∗
(0.072) (0.158) (0.055) (0.003)
Local External Pol. Efficacy 0.143
∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 0.003 -0.044 -0.076
∗ 0.019
(0.945) (0.188) (0.028) (0.602)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.098
∗∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.027∗
(0.000) (0.036) (0.008) (0.034)
Centre City(=1) 0.082 0.143
∗ 0.137∗ 0.083
(0.207) (0.025) (0.043) (0.187)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern) -0.068(0.246)
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart) 0.039(0.539)
Lyon (Baseline=Paris) -0.000(0.997)
London (Baseline=Birmingham) -0.019(0.759)
Constant 0.432
∗ 0.268 0.336 0.842∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.100) (0.074) (0.000)
N 854 1001 957 904
Adjusted-R2 0.141 0.206 0.239 0.263
F-Test 11.815 20.899 24.064 25.803
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata.
Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05
**<0.01 ***<0.001. 55
Table A9: OLS-Regression: Metropolitan Reform Index and Trust in Subnational Insti-
tutions by Country
Switzerland Germany France United Kingdom
β β β β
(p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|) (p>|t|)
Trust: Subnational Institutions 0.140
∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female(=1) -0.186
∗∗ -0.126∗ -0.121 0.021
(0.003) (0.036) (0.051) (0.725)
Age in Years -0.008
∗∗∗ -0.005∗ 0.000 -0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.011) (0.990) (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)
Edu. Medium -0.041 0.052 -0.156 0.111(0.764) (0.598) (0.259) (0.199)
Edu. High 0.087 0.025 -0.040 0.101(0.540) (0.810) (0.774) (0.179)
Income (Baseline=Low)
Inc. Medium 0.117 0.039 -0.006 0.106(0.144) (0.588) (0.940) (0.152)
Inc. High 0.188
∗ -0.042 -0.034 0.082
(0.036) (0.594) (0.703) (0.307)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)
Int. High 0.015 0.095 0.188
∗ 0.012
(0.861) (0.243) (0.014) (0.881)
Local External Pol. Efficacy 0.091
∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy 0.030 0.138
∗∗∗ 0.036 0.119∗∗∗
(0.490) (0.000) (0.328) (0.001)
Left-Right Self-Placement -0.061
∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.006 0.038∗∗
(0.000) (0.600) (0.535) (0.002)
Centre City(=1) 0.089 0.191
∗∗ 0.021 0.067
(0.183) (0.005) (0.764) (0.250)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern) -0.193
∗∗
(0.001)
Stuttgart (Baseline=Berlin) -0.154
∗
(0.023)
Lyon (Baseline=Paris) 0.003(0.963)
London (Baseline=Birmingham) 0.057(0.333)
Constant 0.532
∗∗ 0.158 0.198 0.058
(0.006) (0.360) (0.321) (0.740)
N 834 976 941 921
Adjusted-R2 0.120 0.125 0.154 0.321
F-Test 9.775 11.687 14.163 34.423
p > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata.
Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05
**<0.01 ***<0.001. 56
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